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a b s t r a c t
We present a variant of the Datalog language (we call it DatalogW ), which is able to
deal with weights on ground facts. The weights are chosen from a semiring algebraic
structure. Our goal is to use this language as a semantic foundation for trust-management
languages, in order to express trust relationships associated with a preference (e.g., a cost,
an uncertainty, a trust or a fuzzy value). We apply DatalogW as the basis to give a uniform
semantics to a weighted extension of the RT language family, called RTW . Moreover, we
show that we can model the deduction and abduction reasoning with semiring-based soft
constraints: deduction can validate or not the access request, while abduction can be used
to compute the missing credentials if the access is denied and the level of preference that
would grant the access.
© 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction and motivations
In this work, we extend the Role-based Trust-management language family (RT ) [1] with weighted credentials, in order to
enrich the access authorization decision with a value that represents an access degree level. The weights set and operations
are modeled within a semiring-based framework [2,3]. These weights can represent a cost, a trust or an uncertainty score,
or in general, a preference associated with each credential. As a second step, we show how, by using semiring-based soft
constraints [2,3] and a policy written in the weighted version of RT (i.e., RTW ), we can model the deduction and abduction
processes [4,5], which can be respectively used to deduce if the access can be granted and to compute themissing credentials
if it cannot be deduced.
A trust-management language is needed to have the expressivity power to represent the trust-related facts of the
considered dominion and a method to derive new assessments and decision starting from these base facts. Current trust-
management languages based on credentials (for both expressing facts and access policy rules) use several foundational
approaches. However, facts and access rules are not so crisp in the real complexworld. For example, eachpiece of information
could have a confidence value associatedwith it and representing a reliability estimation, or a fuzzy preference level or a cost
to be taken in account. The feedback final value, obtained by aggregating all the ground facts together, can be then used to
improve the decision support system by basing on this preference level instead of a plain ‘‘yes or no’’ result (e.g., see [6–8]).
In this scenario, a credential could state that the referred entity is a ‘‘student’’ or a ‘‘bright student’’ with a probability of 80%
because her/his identity of student is based on what an acquaintance asserts (thus, it is not as certain as declared in IDs).
In the literature, there are many examples where trust or reputation is computed by aggregating some values together [9],
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for example in PGP systems, or for generic trust propagation inside social networks. We think that similar quantitative
measurements are useful also for trust languages, in order to have a more informative result on the authorization decision
process.
For this reason, in this paperwedescribe aweighted version ofDatalog (we call itDatalogW )where the rules are enhanced
with values taken from a proper semiring structure [2,3], in order to model the preference/cost system.
We use DatalogW as the basis to give declarative semantics to a weighted version of the RT family of languages [1],
used to describe policies and credentials. We called our weighted family RTW and, according to the guidelines given in [1],
it comprehends the languages RTW0 , RT
W
1 , RT
W
2 , RT
WT and RTWD, where the statements are ‘‘soft’’ in the sense that each
credential is associated to a semiring value.
Indeed, there are good reasons to prefer a language, as DatalogW , that is declarative and has a formal foundation.
In this sense, we are following a similar approach as done in [10] for the RT family, where classical Datalog with crisp
constraints has been proposed for the RT languages. Since trust is not necessarily crisp,DatalogW can be used to give a formal
‘‘weighted’’ semantics to the same family of languages instead. Moreover, other languages in the literature can benefit from
the underlying semantics provided byDatalogW : several trust-management languages are based onDatalog , e.g., Delegation
Logic [11], the RT [1] (as already stated), KeyNote [12] and RBAC [13].
Our systematic approach to give weights to facts and rules, contributes also toward bridging the gap between ‘‘rule-
based’’ trust management (i.e., crisp security mechanisms) and ‘‘reputation based’’ trust management [9] (i.e., weighted
security mechanisms).
Having defined the language, thenwe need to formally (and then in practice) define the fundamental reasoning processes
used to control the access for RTW policies and credentials. Two basic services can be used inside access control systems:
deduction and abduction [4,5].
In deduction [4,5], given a policy and a set of additional facts and events, the service finds out all consequences (actions
or obligations) of the policy and the facts, i.e., whether granting the access can be deduced from the policy and the current
facts. Since we are considering RTW , deduction is improved with a t threshold score, thus allowing the access only if the
presented weighted credentials can provide a level better than t (where ‘‘better’’ depends on the chosen semiring).
The second service in access control, requested for more complex reasoning, is abduction [4,5]. Loosely speaking in
reverse, given a policy and a request of access, abduction consists in finding the credentials/events that would grant access,
i.e., a (possibly minimal) set of facts that added to the policy would make the request a logical consequence. The intuition
behind an interactive (client–server) access control system is the following: (i) initially a client submits a set of credentials
and a service request then, (ii) the server checks whether the request is granted by the access policy according to the client’s
set of credentials. If the check fails, (iii) by using abductive reasoning the server finds a (minimal) solution set of (disclosable)
missing credentials that unlocks the desired resource and (iv) returns them to the client, so that (v) he can provide them in
the second round (however, this kind of negotiation protocol is outside the scope of this paper). Together with the missing
credentials, our abduction process returns also the (minimal) missing level of preference that would grant the access, in
order to reach the imposed t threshold.
To propose a practical example, access control for autonomic communication needs the abduction reasoning service [14].
The key idea is that in an autonomic network a client may have the right credentials but may not know them and thus an
autonomic communication server needs a way to avoid leaving the client stranded.
The deduction and abduction operations on RTW policies have been implemented by semiring-based soft constraints
operators (see Section 2), keeping the underlying machinery of our work within the same framework defined in [2,3,15].
In order to show a real implementation of the deduction/abduction procedures over RTW policies, finally we have used
the Constraint Handling Rules language (CHR) [16]. CHR is a high-level language designed for writing user-defined constraint
systems. It is a committed-choice language consisting of guarded rules that rewrite constraints into simpler ones until they
are solved.
This paper integrates a polished revision of [17,15,18]. In Section 2 we describe the background about semirings and
semiring-based soft constraints. In Section 3 we present a weighted version of Datalog , i.e., DatalogW , while Section 4
features RTW0 , RT
W
1 and RT
W
2 , based on Datalog
W ; Section 4 also describes the semantics inclusions between these three
‘‘brick’’ languages. Then, Sections 5 and 6 respectively present other two languages of the family, RTWT and RTWD, which
can be used, together or separately, with each of RTW0 , RT
W
1 , or RT
W
2 . Section 7 provides how the deduction reasoning can
be modeled with soft constraint operators and presents a CHR implementation; Section 8 shows the same for the abduction
reasoning. Section 9 reports the related work in the literature and, finally, in Section 10 we draw the final conclusions and
ideas about future work.
2. Background on semiring-based soft constraints
Semirings. An absorptive semiring [19] S can be represented as a ⟨A,+,×, 0, 1⟩ tuple such that: (i) A is a set and 0, 1 ∈ A;
(ii) + is commutative, associative and 0 is its unit element; (iii) × is associative, distributes over +, 1 is its unit element
and 0 is its absorbing element. Moreover,+ is idempotent, 1 is its absorbing element and× is commutative. Let us consider
the relation ≤S over A such that a≤S b iff a + b = b. Then it is possible to prove that (see [3]): (i) ≤S is a partial order;
(ii) + and × are monotonic on ≤S ; (iii) 0 is its minimum and 1 its maximum; (iv) ⟨A,≤S⟩ is a complete lattice and, for all
a, b ∈ A, a + b = lub(a, b) (where lub is the least upper bound). Informally, the relation ≤S gives us a way to compare
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Fig. 1. Five weighted soft constraints; notice that c3 = c1 ⊗ c2 and c5 = c3 c4 .
semiring values and constraints. In fact, when we have a≤S b (or simply a ≤ b when the semiring will be clear from the
context), we will say that b is better than a.
In [19] the authors extended the semiring structure by adding the notion of division, i.e.,÷, as a weak inverse operation
of×. An absorptive semiring S is invertible if, for all the elements a, b ∈ A such that a ≤ b, there exists an element c ∈ A such
that b× c = a [19]. If S is absorptive and invertible, then, S is invertible by residuation if the set {x ∈ A | b× x = a} admits a
maximum for all elements a, b ∈ A such that a ≤ b [19]. Moreover, an absorptive S is residuated if the set {x ∈ A | b×x ≤ a}
admits a maximum for all elements a, b ∈ A: with an abuse of notation, the maximal element among solutions is denoted
a÷ b.
The notion of semiring division can be applied to all the classical semirings instances [3], as the Boolean
⟨{false, true},∨,∧, false, true⟩, Fuzzy ⟨[0, 1],max,min, 0, 1⟩, Probabilistic ⟨[0, 1],max, ×ˆ, 0, 1⟩ (×ˆ is the arithmetic
multiplication) andWeighted ⟨R+ ∪ {+∞},min, +ˆ,∞, 0⟩ semiring (+ˆ is the arithmetic plus operation): the reason is that
all these semirings are complete and consequently residuated [19]. Therefore, for all these semirings it is possible to use the
÷ operation as a ‘‘particular’’ inverse of×.
A further (residuated) semiring that will be used in Example 3 (see Section 4) is the path semiring [20]: Strust =
⟨⟨[0, 1], [0, 1]⟩,+p,×p, ⟨0, 0⟩, ⟨1, 1⟩⟩ to compute the trust level, where
⟨ti, ci⟩+p⟨tj, cj⟩ =
⟨ti, ci⟩ if ci > cj,
⟨tj, cj⟩ if ci < cj,
⟨max(ti, tj), ci⟩ if ci = cj.
⟨ti, ci⟩×p⟨tj, cj⟩ = ⟨ti×ˆtj, ci×ˆcj⟩.
In this case, trust information is represented by a couple of values ⟨t, c⟩: the first component represents a trust value in the
range [0, 1], while the second component represents the accuracy of the trust value assignment (i.e., a confidence value),
and it is still in the range [0, 1]. This parameter can be assumed as a quality of the opinion represented instead by the trust
value; for example, a high confidence could mean that the trustor has interacted with the target for a long time and then
the correlated trust value is estimated with precision. According to the definition of×p, the trust and confidence values are
respectively multiplied together (i.e., ×ˆ is the arithmetic multiplication), and with+p we prefer the couple with the higher
confidence values; the two confidence values are equal, we choose the couple with the higher trust value.
Soft Constraints. A soft constraint [3,2] may be seen as a constraint where each instantiation of its variables has an associated
preference. Given S = ⟨A,+,×, 0, 1⟩ and an ordered set of variables V over a (finite) domainD, a soft constraint is a function
which, given an assignment η : V → D of the variables, returns a value of the semiring. Using this notation C = η → A is
the set of all possible constraints that can be built starting from S,D and V .
0¯ and 1¯ respectively represent the constraints associating the 0 and 1 of the semiring to all assignments of domain values;
in general, the a¯ function returns the semiring value a.
Any function in C involves all the variables in V , but we impose that it depends on the assignment of only a finite subset
of them. So, for instance, a binary constraint cx,y over variables x and y, is a function cx,y : (V → D) → A, but it depends
only on the assignment of variables {x, y} ⊆ V (the support, or scope, of the constraint). Note that cη[v := d1] means cη′
where η′ is η modified with the assignment v := d1. Notice also that, with cη, the result we obtain is a semiring value, i.e.,
cη = awith a ∈ A.
Given the set C, the combination function of constraints⊗ : C × C → C is defined as (c1 ⊗ c2)η = c1η × c2η.
The constraint division function : C × C → C (which subtracts the second constraint from the first one) is
instead defined as (c1 c2)η = c1η ÷ c2η [19]: given S = ⟨A,+,×, 0, 1⟩, a ÷ b is defined as the m maximal element
of the set {x ∈ A | b × x ≤ a}. Therefore, n≤S m for every other element n in the set and, extended to constraints,
cn⊑S cm ⇐⇒ cn(x = n)≤S cm(x = m), i.e., the other possible constraints For this reason, the operator is able to
find the minimal explanation (see Section 8), sincem is the maximum we can remove with÷.
It is worth to notice that our operation can be considered as a ‘‘relaxation’’, and not a strict removal of a constraint.
For example, considering the five soft constraints reported in Fig. 1 and the Weighted semiring SWeighted = ⟨R+ ∪
{+∞},min, +ˆ,+∞, 0⟩, we have that c1 ⊗ c2 = c3. Since the operator consists in a relaxation, we can also remove
c4 from c3 (i.e., not only c1 or c2), that is c3 c4 = c5, even if c4 is different from both c1 and c2.
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Fig. 2. A soft CSP based on a weighted semiring.
Informally, performing the ⊗ or the between two constraints means building a new constraint whose support
involves all the variables of the original ones, and which associates with each tuple of domain values for such variables
a semiring element which is obtained by multiplying or, respectively, dividing the elements associated by the original
constraints to the appropriate sub-tuples. The partial order≤S over C can be easily extended among constraints by defining
c1 ⊑ c2 ⇐⇒ c1η ≤ c2η.Moreover, consider the setC (and its power-set℘(C)) and the partial order⊑. Then, an entailment
relation ⊢⊆ ℘(C)× C is defined s.t. for each C ∈ ℘(C) and c ∈ C, we have C ⊢ c ⇐⇒  C ⊑ c.
Given two constraints c1 and c2, if we have c1 ⊢ c2 then we can say that c2 is a logical consequence of c1: we will use this
operator in order to abduce the missing credentials in Section 8.
Given a constraint c ∈ C and a variable v ∈ V , the projection of c over V − {v}, written c⇓(V\{v}) is the constraint c ′ such
that c ′η =d∈D cη[v := d]. Informally, projecting means eliminating some variables from the support.
A Soft Constraint Satisfaction Problem (SCSP) [2] is defined as P = ⟨C, con⟩ (C is the set of constraints and con ⊆ V , i.e., the
subset of interest among the problem variables). The best level of consistency notion defined as blevel(P) = Sol(P)⇓∅, where
Sol(P) = ( C)⇓con [2]. A problem P is α-consistent if blevel(P) = α [2]; if P is α1-consistent then it is also α2-consistent
if α1≤S α2. P is instead simply ‘‘consistent’’ iff there exists α >S 0 such that P is α-consistent [2]. P is inconsistent if it is not
consistent.
Example 1. Fig. 2 shows aweighted SCSP P = ⟨C = {c1, c2, c2}, con = {X, Y }⟩ as a graph: the used semiring is theWeighted
semiring, i.e., ⟨R+ ∪ {+∞},min, +ˆ,∞, 0⟩. Variables and constraints are represented respectively by nodes and by arcs
(unary for c1 and c3, and binary for c2), and semiring values are written to the right of each tuple. V = {X, Y } and D = {a, b}.
The solution of the CSP in Fig. 2 associates a semiring element to every domain value of variablesX and Y by combining all the
constraints together, i.e., Sol(P) = C . For instance, for the tuple ⟨a, a⟩ (that is, X = Y = a), we have to compute the sumof
1 (which is the value assigned to X = a in constraint c1), 5 (which is the value assigned to ⟨X = a, Y = a⟩ in c2) and 5 (which
is the value for Y = a in c3). Hence, the resulting value for this tuple is 11. For the other tuples, ⟨a, b⟩ → 7, ⟨b, a⟩ → 16 and
⟨b, b⟩ → 16. The blevel for the example in Fig. 2 is 7 (related to the solution X = a, Y = b), which represents the solution
with the best preference.
3. A weighted extension of Datalog
Datalog [21] is a restricted form of logic programming with variables, predicates, and constants, but without function
symbols. Facts and rules are represented as Horn clauses in the generic form R0 : −R1, . . . , Rn. A Datalog rule has the form:
R0(t0,1, . . . , t0,k0) : −R1(t1,1, . . . , t1,k1), . . . , Rn(tn,1, . . . , tn,kn)
where R0, . . . , Rn are predicate (relation) symbols and each term ti,j is either a constant or a variable (0 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ j ≤
ki). The formula R0(t0,1, . . . , t0,k0) is called the head of the rule and the sequence R1(t1,1, . . . , t1,k1), . . . , Rn(tn,1, . . . , tn,kn)
the body. If the body is empty, the rule is called a fact. A program in Datalog is a set of rules; a program P must satisfy two
safety conditions: (i) all variables occurring in the head of a rule also have to appear in the body, and (ii) every fact in P must
be a ground fact.
We can now define ourWeighted Datalog, or DatalogW based on classical Datalog . While rules have the same form as in
classical Datalog , a fact in DatalogW has the form:
Ri(xi,1, . . . , xi,ki) : −s.
Therefore, the extension is obtained by associating to ground facts a value s ∈ A taken from the semiring ⟨A,+,×, 0, 1⟩.
This value describes some properties of the fact, depending on the chosen semiring: for example, we can add together all
these values by using theWeighted semiring ⟨R+ ∪ {+∞},min, +ˆ,∞, 0⟩, trying to minimize the overall sum at the same
time. Otherwise, we can find the best global preference level by using the Fuzzy semiring ⟨[0, 1],max,min, 0, 1⟩ or we
can retrieve the highest resulting probability when we compose all the ground facts, by using the Probabilistic semiring
⟨[0, 1],max, ×ˆ, 0, 1⟩.
Fig. 3 shows an example ofDatalogW program, forwhichwe suppose to use theWeighted semiring. The intuitivemeaning
of a semiring value like 3 associated to the atom r(a) (in Fig. 3) is that r(a) costs 3 units. Thus the set N contains all possible
costs, and the choice of the two operations min and+ implies that we intend to minimize the sum of the costs. This gives us
the possibility to select the atom instantiation which gives the minimum cost overall. Given a goal like s(X) to this program,
the operational semantics collects both a substitution for X (in this case, X = a) and also a semiring value (in this case,
2) which represents the minimum cost among the costs for all derivations for s(X). To find one of these solutions, it starts
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Fig. 3. A simple DatalogW program.
from the goal and uses the clauses as usual in logic programming, except that at each step two items are accumulated and
combined with the current state: a substitution and a semiring value (both provided by the used clause). The combination
of these two items with what is contained in the current goal is done via the usual combination of substitutions (for the
substitution part) and via the multiplicative operation of the semiring (for the semiring value part), which in this example
is the arithmetic +. Thus, in the example of goal s(X), we get two possible solutions, both with substitution X = a but
with two different semiring values: 2 and 3. Then, the combination of such two solutions via the min operation give us the
semiring value 2.
Finite Computation Time. Being the DatalogW language a subset of the Soft Constraint Logic Programming language [22] with
no functions, we can use the results in [22] to prove that, considering a given DatalogW program, the time for computing
the value of any goal for this program is finite and bounded by a constant, as Theorem 1 states:
Theorem 1 (Finite Set of Simple Refutations). Given a DatalogW program P and a goal C, consider the set SR(C) of simple
refutations starting from C and building the empty substitution. Then SR(C) is finite. Moreover, each refutation in SR(C) has
length at most N, where N = ci=1 bi, c is the number of all clauses with head instantiated in all possible ways, and b is the
greatest number of atoms in the body of a clause in program P.
Proof. The proof of the theorem is identical to the one given in [22]. Each simple refutation tree has the property that no two
labels in a path from the root to a leaf are the same. Since such labels are clauses plus head instantiations, each path is long at
most as the number of all possible clause head instantiations, say c. Furthermore, the branching factor of a simple refutation
tree depends on the number of atoms in the bodies of the clauses used in the refutation. Thus, the number of nodes of a
simple refutation tree, and, consequently, of steps in a simple refutation, is bounded by
c
i=1 bi. Therefore, solving a goal C
takes O(SR(C) ·ci=1 bi) steps. 
4. Extending RT 0,RT 1 and RT 2 with weights
We describe four kinds of credentials for defining roles in a TM language family, here called RTW , which is based on
DatalogW (see Section 3). This family uniformly extends the classical RT family [1] by associating a semiring value to the
basic role definition. Therefore, all the following credentials must be parameterized with a chosen ⟨A,+,×, 0, 1⟩ semiring
in order represent preference/cost or fuzzy information associated to the statements. For every following RTW0 credential,
we describe how it can be translated in a corresponding DatalogW rule.
Rule 1 A.R ←− ⟨B, s⟩ where A and B are (possibly the same) entities, and R is a role name. This means that A defines B to
be a member of A’s R role. This statement can be translated to DatalogW with the rule r(A, B) : −s, where s is the
semiring value associated with the related ground fact, i.e., s ∈ A.
Rule 2 A.R ←− B.R1 This statementmeans that A defines its R role to include (all members of) B’s R1 role. The corresponding
DatalogW rule is r(A, x) : −r1(B, x).
Rule 3 A.R ←− A.R1.R2, where A.R1.R2 is defined as linked role [1] and it means that A defines its R role to include
(the members of) every role B.R2 in which B is a member of A.R1 role. The mapping to DatalogW is r(A, x) :
−r1(A, y), r2(y, x).
Rule 4 A.R ←− B1.R1 ∩ B2.R2 ∩ · · · ∩ Bn.Rn. In this way, A defines its R role to include the intersection of the n roles. It can
be translated to DatalogW with r(A, x) : −r1(B1, x), r2(B2, x), . . . , rn(Bn, x).
The semantics of a program using these rules will find the best credential chain according to the+ operator of the chosen
semiring, which defines a partial order≤S . Notice that only the basic role definition statement (i.e., Rule 1) is enhanced with
the semiring value s ∈ S, since the other three rules are used to include one role into another or to obtain the intersection
of different roles.
Since Datalog is a subset of first-order logic, the semantics of a TM language based on it is declarative and unambiguous.
While the × operator of the semiring is used to compose the preference/cost values associated to the statements, the +
is used to let the framework select the best derivation chain with more chances to authorize the requester (among all the
credentials revealed by her/him).
A credential, in a general definition, is an attestation of qualification, competence, or authority issued to an individual by
a third party with the authority or the competence to do so. A policy describes the rules that grant the authorization. As an
example, consider the first four rows in Fig. 4 as policy rules, and the other rows as (weighted) credential definition.
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Fig. 4. An example in RTW0 , with fuzzy values associated to the credentials.
Example 2. In Fig. 4we showanexample ofRTW0 , extending the example presented in [1]withweights. To solve the example
in Fig. 4, we use aWeighted semiring ⟨R+∪{+∞},min, +ˆ,∞, 0⟩, where the elements inR+∪{+∞} represents the number
of negative feedbacks the credential has received: for example, StateU.highMarks←− ⟨Alice, 4⟩ in Fig. 4 certifies that
Alice has obtained highmarks for the exams completed at the StateU university (the credential is issued by StateU) and that
this credential has received 4 negative feedbacks by a system that collects a reputation value for the statements contained in
the credentials. Feedbacks can be given by different kinds of entities: e.g., for the considered credential, students, professors,
academic tutors. How these values are collected are outside the scope of the presentation.
This example is focused on bridging the gap between ‘‘rule-based’’ trust management (i.e., crisp security mechanisms)
and ‘‘reputation based’’ trust management [9] (i.e., weighted security mechanisms). However, weights can be used in our
framework to represent also other kinds of preference, as (money) costs, fuzzy or certainty degrees and all that can be
modeled as semiring (see Section 2).
The example in Fig. 4 describes a fictitious Web publishing service, EPub, which offers a discount to anyone who is both
a preferred customer and a bright student. EPub delegates the authority over the identification of preferred customers to
its parent organization, EOrg. In order to be evaluated as a preferred customer, EOrg must issues two different types of
credentials stating that the customer is not new (i.e., EOrg.oldCustomer) and has already spent some money in the past
(i.e., EOrg.highBudget). EOrg assigns a score to both these two credentials to quantify the money cost of these certificates.
EPub delegates the authority over the identification of bright students to the entities that are accredited universities. To
identify such universities, EPub accepts accrediting credentials issued by the fictitious Accrediting Board for Universities
(ABU). ABU evaluates a university with a score and each university evaluates its enrolled students. A student is bright if
she/he is both enrolled in a good university and has high marks. By composing the reputation values of all the credentials
in order to be authorized for the discount, we know that the credentials have received a total of 2+ˆ4+ˆ3+ˆ2 = 11 negative
feedbacks. If the access system imposes a threshold of, e.g., 12 negative feedbacks, we can access to the discount since
12≤S 11, where S = ⟨R+ ∪ {+∞},min, +ˆ,∞, 0⟩ in this case.
Example 3. In Fig. 5 we extend the example of Fig. 4 in order to represent also a case where the access to the system is
granted by following different subsets of credentials (i.e., following several refutation paths). With respect to Fig. 4, in Fig. 5
a customer receives the discount even if she/he presents a good recommendation letter (i.e., EPub.famousProf.goodRecLetter).
In this example we use the path semiring presented in Section 2, thus a semiring value consists in a couple of
⟨trust, confidence⟩ feedbacks. The best derivation chain corresponds to the criteria defined by the+p: between two couples,
we prefer the one with the higher confidence value or, if the confidence values are equal, the couple with the higher trust
value. Confidence and trust values are both in the [0..1] interval and are composed by using the arithmetic multiplication.
Therefore, with the program in Fig. 5 we obtain two solution with costs ⟨0.3, 0.25⟩ and ⟨0.81, 0.72⟩ respectively. By using
+p we prefer the solution with cost ⟨0.81, 0.72⟩.
Figs. 6 and 7 show the two Datalog refutation paths for the RTW0 program in Fig. 5.
In the next subsectionswe suggest how to extendRTW0 with parameterized roles (thus obtainingRT
W
1 ), and how to further
extend the language with logical rights (obtaining RTW2 ). In Section 4.3 we finally show a theorem explaining the inclusion
relationships among RTW0 , RT
W
1 , RT
W
2 and their original (i.e., not weighted) versions.
4.1. RTW1 : parameterized roles
It is easy to extend RTW0 in order to enhance it with parameterized roles, thus obtaining a RT
W
1 language following
the hierarchy presented in [1]. This parametrization can be used to represent the relationships among entities,
e.g., University.professorOf(student) to name the professor of a student. Parametrization can also be used to represent
attributes that have fields, e.g., the number of exams or the enrollment academic year and so on.With respect to the previous
four rules, in RTW1 the head of a credential has the form A.R(h1, . . . , hn), in which A is an entity, and R(h1, . . . , hn) is a role
name (R is a role identifier). For each i ∈ 1, . . . , n, hi is a data term having the type of the ith parameter of R. For example,
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Fig. 5. An extension of the example in Fig. 4, by using the path semiring.
Fig. 6. The trust/confidence value for this set of credentials is ⟨0.3, 0.25⟩ by using the path semiring in Section 3.
Fig. 7. The trust/confidence value for this set of credentials is ⟨0.81, 0.72⟩ by using the path semiring in Section 3.
Rule 1 can be rewritten in RTW1 as ⟨A.R(h1, . . . , hn), s⟩ ←− B, and mapped to DatalogW as r(A, B, h1, . . . , hn) : − s. Our
intention is to extend the RTW family according to the guidelines explained in [1] (see Section 10).
A variable that appears in an RT 1 [1], and consequently RTW1 , credential can be either named or anonymous. A named
variable takes the form of a question mark ‘‘?’’ followed by an alpha-numeric string. If a variable appears only once in a
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Fig. 8. An example in RTW1 .
Fig. 9. An example in RTW2 .
credential, it does not need to have a name and can be anonymous. An anonymous variable is represented by the question
mark alone. Note that two different appearances of ‘‘?’’ in a credential represent two distinct variables [1].
Example 4. In the example in Fig. 8 we show an example where Alice may receive the discount because StateU released a
diploma with her name in 1962 and the discount is offered to all the alumni enrolled in the years 1960–1965. Moreover,
a proof from a professor of Alice must be collected as a credential. Credentials are weighted with negative feedbacks as in
Example 4. Notice that we can express some constraints on the values of the attributes, that is: ‘‘[1960 . . . 1965]’’ [1].
4.2. RTW2 : logical rights
Trust languages can be used to grant some permissions, i.e., to represent access modes over some specific objects. For
this reason it useful to group logically related objects (e.g., the files inside the same directory) and access modes, and to give
permissions about them in a correlated manner. RTW2 extends RT
W
1 with logical rights.
As proposed in [1], we introduce in our language the notion of o-sets, which are used to group together this kind of
objects: o-sets names are created by associating an o-set identifier to a tuple of data terms. Moreover, an o-set identifier has
a base type τ , and o-set names/o-sets created by using an o-set identifier have the same base type as the o-set identifier.
Finally, the value of an o-set is a set of values in τ [1]. An o-set-definition credential is similar to the role definition credential
that we have defined in Section 4.1 for RTW1 : the difference is that the members of o-sets are objects that are not entities.
For example, StateURegistrar.cv(modify)←− ⟨studyPlan, 0.3⟩ states that the registrar’s office of StateU university
grants to the studyPlan of a student the permission to bemodified only for the 30% of it.
O-set-definition credentials can be translated in Datalog exactly as proposed for RTW0 and RT
W
1 in Section 4: the head
of a credential has the form A.O(h1, . . . , hn), where O(h1, . . . , hn) is an o-set name of type τ , while the body can be a
value of base type τ , another o-set B.O(s1, . . . , sm) of base type τ , a linked o-set A.R(t1, . . . , tl).O(s1, . . . , sm), in which
R(t1, . . . , tl) is a role name and O(s1, . . . , sm) is an o-set name of base type τ , or an intersection of ko-sets of the base type
τ , i.e., O1(· · · ) ∩ O2(· · · ) ∩ · · · ∩ Ok(· · · ) (see Section 5 for the intersection of roles and o-sets).
Therefore, a credential in RTW2 is either a role-definition credential or an o-set-definition credential. For more details on
types and properties of RTW2 credentials (w.r.t. RT
W
1 ones), please refer to [1].
Example 5. In the example in Fig. 9, we suppose that the plan of study (i.e., StudyPlan) in Computer Science (cs) of a
given student, part of her/his cv, can be modified for its 30%. Moreover, the registrar’s office of the StateU university
(i.e., StudentRegistrar) states that Alice is at her first year at StateU and, therefore, she can modify her plan of study in
Computer Science (cs) for its 10% only, since she is a freshwoman. In this way it is possible to combine the general and more
specific rights together; we suppose to use a fuzzy composition of rights by using the Fuzzy semiring ⟨[0, 1],max,min, 0, 1⟩.
From the RTW2 in Fig. 9 we derive StudentRegistrar.studyP(modify, studyPlan)←− ⟨Alice, 0.1⟩: Alice can modify
her StudyPlan for a percentage of min(0.3, 0.1) = 0.1.
4.3. Language family inclusion
In the next theoremwe claim that ourweighted language family can be used to represent also classical RT credentials [1].
In this sense, the RTW languages can be considered as a foundation layer for all the classical RT languages.
Theorem 2 (Language Family Inclusion). For each set of statements in the RT 0, RT 1 or RT 2 language, we can find an equivalent
set of statements respectively represented in RTW0 , RT
W
1 or RT
W
2 , whose semantics is the same.
Proof. In Fig. 10 we show the theorem result, i.e., the vertical inclusions; the horizontal ones are explained in [1]. The
proof of the theorem comes from using the Boolean semiring ⟨{false, true},∨,∧, false, true⟩ and by assigning a weight of 1
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Fig. 10. A hierarchy of RTW languages, compared with the classical RT one.
(i.e., the true value) to all the ground facts. In this way we obtain a set of crisp statements and the semantics returns all the
possible derivation paths, as the corresponding RT set of statements would do. Therefore, the original ‘‘crisp’’ version of the
RT languages can bemodeledwith RTW languages based on the semiring structure. By using other types of semiring (e.g., the
Weighted semiring) we clearly become more expressive, since we can take decisions based on different preferences. 
In Sections 5 and 6 we respectively introduce other two RT -based languages: RTWT and RTWD can be used, together or
separately, with each of RTW0 , RT
W
1 , or RT
W
2 . The resulting combinations are written as RT
W
i , RT
WT
i and RT
WD
i for i = 0, 1, 2.
5. RTWT : threshold and separation-of-duty policies
RTWT can be used, together or separately, with each of RTW0 , RT
W
1 , or RT
W
2 . The resulting combinations are written
RTWT0 , RT
WT
1 and RT
WT
2 .
Threshold structures are satisfied by the agreement of k out of a set of entities that satisfy a specified condition, while
separation of duty that two or more different people be responsible for the completion of a sensitive task, such deciding the
result of an exam.With Rule 4 (see Section 4) it is possible to implement simple threshold structures by using the intersection
of roles; for example, the policy stating that a student is considered bright only if two out of three professors confirm this,
can be represented by the three rules Uni.bS ←− P1.bS ∩ P2.bS,Uni.bS ←− P1.bS ∩ P3.bS and Uni.bS ←− P2.bS ∩ P3.bS
(where Pi is the ith professor and bS means ‘‘bright student’’).
However, with the intersection operator we are not able to express complex policies, for example we can represent the
fact that A states that an entity b has attribute R if two different entities having attribute R1 state that b has attribute R;
for this reason we introduce the new RTWT language. In order to attain this, we need to work with sets of entities. More
specifically, RTWT adds to the ‘‘unweighted’’ RTW language the notion of manifold roles, which generalizes the notion of
roles [1]. A manifold role has a value that is a set of entity collections. An entity collection is either an entity, which can be
viewed as a singleton set, or a set of two or more entities.
In RTWT we introduce two more types of credentials w.r.t. Section 4:
Rule 5 A.R ←− B1.R1 ⊙ · · · ⊙ Bk.Rk. As we have introduced before with words, the meaning of this credential is
members(A.R) ⊇ members(B1.R1 ⊙ · · · ⊙ Bk.Rk) = {s1 ∪ · · · ∪ sk|si ∈ members(Bi.Ri) for 1 ≤ i ≤ k}. Given
w1, . . . , wk as the actual weights of the derivations respectively rooted in B1.R1, . . . , Bk.Rk, the global weight of the
clause is then composed asw1 × w2 × · · · × wk, where× depends from the chosen S semiring.
Rule 6 A.R ←− B1.R1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Bk.Rk. The formal meaning of this credential is instead given by members(A.R) ⊇
members(B1.R1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Bk.Rk) = {s1 ∪ · · · ∪ sk|(si ∈ members(Bi.Ri) ∧ si ∩ sj = ∅) for 1 ≤ i ≠ j ≤ k}. Given
w1, . . . , wk as the actual weights of the derivations respectively rooted in B1.R1, . . . , Bk.Rk, the global weight of the
clause is then composed asw1 × w2 × · · · × wk.
As usual, the DatalogW engine selects the best derivation chain according to the+ operator of the semiring. Considering
RTWT , the translation to DatalogW rules for Rule 1, Rule 2 and Rule 4 credentials is the same as the one presented in Section 4.
Considering Rule 3, Rule 5 and Rule 6, the translation is instead the following one:
Rule 3 A.R ←− A.R1.R2 can be translated to r(A, x) : −r1(A, y), r2(y, x) when size(r1) = 1, or can be translated to
r(A, y) : −r1(A, x), r2(y, x1), . . . , r2(y, xk), setk(x, x1, . . . , xk) when size(r1) = k > 1. Each role identifier has no
a size: the size of a role limits the maximum size of each of its member entity set (see [1] for further details). The new
setk predicate takes k+1 entity collections as arguments, and setk(s, s1, . . . , sk) is true if and only if s = s1∪ · · · ∪ sk;
if si is a entity, it is treated as a single-set element.
Rule 5 A.R ←− B1.R1 ⊙ · · · ⊙ Bk.Rk can be translated to r(A, x) : −r1(B1, x1), r2(B2, x2), . . . , rk(Bk, xk), setk(x, x1, . . . , xk).
Rule 6 A.R ←− B1.R1⊗ · · · ⊗ Bk.Rk can be translated to r(A, x) : −r1(B1, x1), r2(B2, x2), . . . , rk(Bk, xk), nsetk(x, x1, . . . , xk).
The nsetk predicate takes k+ 1 entity collections as arguments and it is true only when s = s1 ∪ · · · ∪ sk and for any
1 ≤ i ≠ j ≤ k, si ∩ sj = ∅.
Example 6. Suppose that for a university office a student is ‘‘bright’’ (i.e., StateU .bS) if one member of StateU .evalExtAdvisor
(i.e., an external advisor, as A and B) and two different members of StateU .EvalProf (i.e., a professor who teaches in that
university, as A (again), C and D), confirm this. This can be represented using the RTWT program in Fig. 11.
If we adopt the Fuzzy semiring ⟨[0, 1],max,min, 0, 1⟩ representing a fuzzy truth score of the credentials, the best
authorization corresponds to the set {A, C} with a value of 0.8 (i.e., the min between 0.9 and 0.8): we remind that A is
both a professor (i.e., A teaches at the university) and an external advisor (i.e., A can be a visiting professor) and therefore
only two entities can satisfy the request. Therefore, with this program we retrieve the best combination of evaluators for a
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Fig. 11. An example in RTWT .
Fig. 12. An example in RTWD .
student: the student is supposed to present her/his signed credentials and to request howmuch she/he is considered bright:
the evaluations of different evaluators are composed by selecting the worst score (with the min operation of the semiring),
but at the end the best chain is selected (by using the max operator).
6. RTWD: delegation of role activations
As RTWT (see Section 5), also RTWD can be used, together or separately, with each of RTW0 , RT
W
1 , or RT
W
2 . The resulting
combinations are written RTWD0 , RT
WD
1 and RT
WD
2 .
RTWD is finally added to our weighted language family in order to handle delegation of the capacity to exercise role
memberships. The motivations are that in many scenarios, an entity prefers not to exercise all his rights. For example, a
professor could want to log as a simple university employee, thus not having the rights to insert or change new exam results
of students, but only having the rights to see her/his number of tickets for. With a weighted extension we are now able to
state ‘‘how much’’ can be delegated to another entity, for example a session or a process. This quantitative delegation can
be used, for example, to add a numerical information on TM systems as KeyNote [23].
Therefore it is possible to quantify the ‘‘amount’’ of delegated rights, e.g., to modify a document, but only for the 80% of
it, which is, for example, less than the rights held by the delegating entity (e.g., 100%); this is the considerable improvement
obtained by adding a semantic sublayer of weights. The delegation takes the following form: B1
D as A.R−−−−→ B2, which means
that B1 delegates to B2 the ability to act on behalf of D in D’s capacity as a member of A.R.
For the definition of the RTWD rules we introduce the forRole predicate as in [1]: forRole(B,D, A.R) can be read as B is
acting for ‘‘D as A.R’’ and it means that B is acting for the role activation in which D activates A.R. The delegation rules can be
translated in the following way: B1
D as A.R−−−−→ B2 forRole(B2,D, A.R)←− forRole(B1,D, A.R). This rule means that B2 is acting
for ‘‘D as A.R’’ if B1 is doing so. Other kinds of delegation rules that can be formulated are presented in [1].
Clearly, even the other rules presented in Sections 4 and 5 (since RTWD could be see as an extension of RTWT )
must be modified according to the introduction of the forRole predicate. For example, A.R ←− ⟨D, s⟩ becomes
forRole(D,D, A.R), rule_weight , where rule_weight : − s and s is the associated semiring value. Therefore we have presented
only the Rule 1 translation and, for sake of brevity, we omit all the other rules translation with the forRole predicate (from
Rule 2 to Rule 6); however the translation is similar to the one proposed in the RTD design in [1], and Rule 1 is the most
important rule since it is the ‘‘directly weighted’’ one. A request is translated in the same way as a delegation credential;
the request is replaced by the dummy entity corresponding to it. For example, the B1
D as A.R−−−−→ req request is translated to
forRole(ReqID, D, A.R)←− forRole(B1, D, A.R), where ReqID is the dummy entity for req.
Example 7. In this example we show an example of delegation.We use theWeighted semiring ⟨R+∪{+∞},min,+,∞, 0⟩
with the same meaning used in Example 2: weights represent negative feedbacks collected for a credential.
In Fig. 12 we have a research group (RGroup) in which we can find members (RGroup.member) and senior members
(RGroup.senior). Eachmember can submit a research proposal for the group (RGroup.submit), but the request can be accepted
(RGroup.approve) only by a seniormember. Clearly, a seniormember is also amember of the group. The RTWD program avoid
the acceptance of a project approved by the same senior member who submitted it.
Suppose now thatA andB are both seniormembers of the group andhave the following credentials:RGroup.senior←−
⟨A, 0⟩ and RGroup.senior←− ⟨B, 0⟩. No negative feedbacks have been received for these credentials.
Therefore, A can submit a project of the group (variable projectID) by issuing A
A as RGroup.member−−−−−−−−−−−→ ⟨proj(projID), 2⟩,
and B can accept it by issuing B
B as RGroup.approve−−−−−−−−−−−→ ⟨proj(projID), 1⟩. We can prove that forRole(ReqID, {A, B},
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Fig. 13. Deduction with CHR rules: solving the example in Fig. 4.
RGroup.projectAccepted), where ReqID is the dummy principal representing proj(projID). If B does not issue the
above approval and A proves the order by also issuing A
A as RGroup.approve−−−−−−−−−−−→ ⟨proj(projID), 2⟩, we cannot prove
forRole(ReqID, {A, B}, RGroup.projectAccepted).
7. Deduction with soft constraints in access control systems
In this section we show how the RTW languages, defined with the help of the semiring-based framework presented in
Section 2, can be used to add quantitative information to the access control decision.
Deductive reasoning constructs or evaluates deductive arguments. Deductive arguments are attempts to show that a
conclusion necessarily follows from a set of premises or hypotheses. Deduction is the basic reasoning in access control
system [4], since it checks, from the credentials and the access policy (the premises) if the access authorization can be
granted or not (the conclusion). The deduction process [4,5] can be defined by using the constraint operators shown in
Section 2.
Definition 1 (Deduction with Soft Constraints). Given a soft constraint σ which represents the current knowledge and a soft
constraint c , if σ ⊢ r then σ entails (i.e., deduces) r .
With respect to Definition 1, σ represents the policy p and the collected credentials c , i.e., σ = p ⊗ c , and σ entails
(i.e., deduces) the access request r if σ ⊢ r .
Deduction in CHR. CHR [16] is a high-level language designed for writing user-defined constraint systems. It is essentially
a committed-choice language consisting of guarded rules that rewrite constraints into simpler ones until they are solved.
There are three kinds of CHR rules: simplification, propagation and simpagation. Simplification rules replace user-defined
constraints by simpler ones. Propagation rules add new redundant constraints that may be necessary to do further
simplifications. A simpagation rule is equivalent to a simplification rule with some of the heads repeated in the body. On a
simpagation rule only the heads after the \ sign are removed. CHR libraries are available in most Prolog implementations:
in particular, for the following examples we have used SWI-Prolog [24].
In Fig. 13 we implement the deduction process by translating the RTW0 program in Fig. 4. Given the five simplification
rules (i.e., policy1, . . . , policy4), which represent the policy, and the first query, (i.e., 1?- in Fig. 13), that is accredited(aBU,
stateU,2), highMarks(stateU, alice,4), highBudget(eOrg, alice,3), oldCustomer(eOrg, alice,2), discount(alice,12)) which represents
the set of presented weighted credentials and the access request (i.e., discount(alice,12)), we are able to deduce that Alice
can access to the discount. In fact the system answers with access(alice). The solver can fire the first rule (i.e., policyrule1)
because the sum of the negative feedbacks of the credentials, which is 11, is lower than the requested threshold in the
discount request, which is 12. Notice that lower means better in this case, since in Example 2 we consider the Weighted
semiring S = ⟨R+ ∪ {+∞},min, +ˆ,∞, 0⟩.
The implementation in Fig. 13 finds if the corresponding SCSP problem is T -consistent (T is in policyrule1, see Section 2
for α-consistency), where T is represented by the access threshold, determined by discount. For query 1?- in Fig. 13 we find
out that the problem is 12-consistent, since the sum of the credentials is 11 and 12≤S 11.
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The second query, that is 2?- in Fig. 13, is presented to show what happens when some necessary credentials are not
presented to the authorization system: without the oldCustomer(eOrg, alice,2) credential missing in the query, the CHR rules
in Fig. 13 are not able to fire policyrule2 rule. The query returns what can be computed with policyrule3 and policyrule4 rule.
8. Abduction of weighted credentials with soft constraints
In this section we define the abduction process [5] by using the semiring-based framework presented in Section 2. In
particular, we adopt the and ⊢ operators (see Section 2 for their formal definitions).
Abduction allows inferring a as an explanation of b. Because of this, abduction allows the precondition a to be abduced
from the consequence b [25,5]. For example suppose that, ‘‘I received a bad review for my paper on a Chemistry-related
topic’’; but if ‘‘I have no background on Chemistry’’ then the first statement would not be so surprising. Therefore, by
abductive reasoning, the possibility that ‘‘I have no background on Chemistry’’ is reasonable and a good explanation for
‘‘I received a bad review for my paper on a Chemistry-related topic’’. Formally, in logic explanation is done from a logical
theory T representing a domain and a set of observations O [25]. Abduction is the process of deriving a set of explanations
of O according to T and choosing one of those explanations. For E to be an explanation of O according to T , it should satisfy
two conditions: (i) O follows from E and T , and (ii) E is consistent with T [25].
Therefore, if σ does not store enough information to satisfy c (i.e., the c conclusion cannot be obtained with deduction),
it is interesting to automatically obtain the missing information that would allow to satisfy c . In Definition 2 we define
abduction by using the operation presented in Section 2:
Definition 2 (Abduction with Soft Constraints). Given two soft constraints σ and r , the abduction process is aimed at finding
a constraint d, such that (σ ⊗ d) ⊢ r , i.e., d = r σ .
Notice that the division operatorwe are adopting is a deterministic operator (see Section 2) and provides a single solution
d (which is also the minimal solution, as explained in the following of this section). Considering Definition 2, the trivial case
is when σ ⊢ r since r σ = 1¯, that is nothing must be added to σ in order to satisfy r , because it is already implied. If we
consider our access control scenario with policies and credentials written in RTW , σ = p⊗ c represents the policy p and the
c set of credentials, and the abduced d constraint is such that (σ ⊗ d) ⊢ r , i.e., d = r σ , where d is the abduced credential
for the access request r .
An explanation is an input which can explain the result (via the given the inference rules). A minimal explanation, is
one which makes just as many assumptions as needed to obtain an explanation [26]. The concept of minimal explanation is
important because it consists in the minimal amount of information needed to obtain the desired consequence: disclosing
more credentials could lead to privacy problems since more than enough information is revealed. The abduction operation
in Definition 2 finds the minimal explanation as proposed in [26] for the crisp version, according to the definition of÷ and
given in Section 2. Therefore, the d constraint in Definition 2 is the minimal explanation of r .
Suppose to have three constraints Student(x), HighMarks(x) and Access(x)which define a preference for a given x student:
the support of these three constraints is {x}. If we have that
σ = Student(Alice)
r = Access(Alice)
and
Student(Alice)⊗ HighMarks(Alice) ⊢ Access(Alice)
then d = r σ = HighMarks(Alice).
If we use the SFuzzy = ⟨[0, 1],max,min, 0, 1⟩ semiring, if Student(Alice) = 0.9 and Access(Alice) = 0.7, then
HighMarks(Alice) = 0.7. Thus Alice needs to attest the fact that she has high marks with a trust score 0.7 or greater. In
the Fuzzy semiring, when σ(x) ≤ r(x), then d(x) = 1, otherwise d(x) = r(x), according to the definition of÷ given in [19]:
a÷ b = max{x | min{b, x} ≤ a} =

1 if b ≤ a
a if a < b.
Now suppose to consider the SWeighted = ⟨R+ ∪ {+∞},min, +ˆ,+∞, 0⟩ semiring. If σ = Student(Alice) = 7 and
r = Access(Alice) = 10, then r σ = d = HighMarks(Alice) = 3. Therefore, this abduction operation suggests Alice
to provide a credential attesting that she has HighMarks with a preference of 3 (e.g. votes) at least. The definition of ÷
(i.e., the arithmetic subtraction −ˆ) is:
a÷ b = min{x | b+ˆx ≥ a} =

0 if b ≥ a
a−ˆb if a > b.
Notice that the credentials can be seen as partially ordered: assistant professor < associate professor < full professor, that
is the full professor credential provides higher access capabilities w.r.t. assistant professor. This partial order can be easily
represented with semiring (see Section 2). This role hierarchy, where higher the role in the hierarchy, more powerful it
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Fig. 14. A lattice representing the strength of roles: fullProf entails all the other roles.
Fig. 15. Abduction with CHR rules.
is, is adopted also in [4]. A role dominates another role if it is higher in the hierarchy and there is a direct path between
them in the lattice representing the hierarchy of roles. For example, fullProf (x) ⊢ dateExam(x) ⊗ roomExam(x), but
assProf (x) ⊢ roomExam(x) only, i.e., the assistant professor has less rights. The complete lattice of roles is shown in Fig. 14.
Abduction in CHR. In Fig. 15 we implement in CHR the abduction procedure for the RTW0 example presented in Fig. 4.
When the access constraint is produced by the program in Fig. 13, in that case we deduce that the access is not granted.
At this point, the rules in Fig. 15 can be used to abduce the missing credentials with the maximum level possible of negative
feedbacks. The query is now represented by the output obtained at the end of the failed deduction procedure in Fig. 13, i.e.,
brightStudent(alice, 6), highBudget(eOrg, alice, 3), discount(alice, 12). The answer to this query (i.e., 1?- in Fig. 15) is that
we need the oldCustomer credential with a number of negative feedbacks less or equal than 2 in order to receive the access
permission: the sum of the weights of the two statements (i.e., brightStudent(alice, 6), highBudget(eOrg, alice, 3)) is 9 and the
discount is granted below a threshold of 12.
Notice that, w.r.t. the policy in Fig. 4, in Fig. 15 we show only the subset of the abduction rules necessary to compute an
answer to query 1?- in Fig. 15: this subset is able to deal with the branch under EPub.preferred, thus the EPub.brightStudent
branchmisses from Fig. 15. These rules are not necessary four our sake, because the brightStudent has been already deduced
by the program in Fig. 13. This can be practically seen from the second query in Fig. 15 (i.e., 2?-), where, providing only
discount(alice, 12), the program abduces only oldCustomer and highBudget. Moreover, it replays with a further constraint
stating that the sum of negative feedbacks for these credentials must be 12 at most (i.e., comb(12)).
9. Related work
Similar variations for RT family languages are defined and implemented in [6] by using different formal tools. There, an
initial comparison (and integration) between Role-based Trust-management (e.g., RT ) and reputation-based trust systems
has been performed and a preliminary (ad-hoc) implementation of the weighted RT language is presented in [27] for GRID
systems. However, having a uniform semantics approach, as the weighted Datalog we are advocating here, to model these
languages could be very useful to provide a commonunderstanding aswell as a basis for systematic comparison and uniform
implementation.
An important extension that significantly enhances the expressivity of RT is represented by RT C [10]. In that work,
the authors present Datalog extended with constraints (denoted by DatalogC) in order to define access permissions over
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structured resources as trees. Our aim is instead the representation of trust levels modeling preferences for credentials.
Therefore, our extension is completely orthogonal w.r.t. RT C .
Some TM systems, such as KeyNote [12] and SPKI/SDI [28], use credentials to delegate permissions, but their delegation
structure is too limited. Each credential delegates certain permissions from its issuer to its subject, acting like a capability,
and therefore they do not address the distributed nature of authority in distributed systems. For instance, it is not possible
to express the statement that anyone who is a student is entitled to a discount.
Datalog was originally developed as a query/rule language for deductive databases and is syntactically equivalent to a
subset of the Prolog language. Several TM languages are based on Datalog , e.g., Delegation Logic [11], the RT framework [1]
(as discussed in this paper), SD3 (Secure Dynamically Distributed Datalog) [29] and Binder [30]. These are some of the
languages that can benefit from the semantic basis presented in this paper, even if we will focus only in the RT language
family.
Several approaches advocated the usage of trust levels w.r.t. attributes, also stated directly in digital credentials. In [8],
the PROTUNE policy language is extended to deal with trust and reputation levels. Also role based access control has been
extended with trust levels in [7]. All these works use specific logics and approaches.
In [31] the authors represent access policies as (crisp) constraint logic programs and apply this model to the Role-Based
Access Control language [13] (RBAC), which is clearly related to RT . In that work, temporal forms of authorization are used to
specifywith constraints an interval of time forwhich an authorization is to hold. Our approach considers instead ‘‘weighted’’
credentials to represent uncertainty or fuzziness (for instance), instead of crisp intervals of values.
As far as we know, deduction and abduction operations has never been tied to the use of weighted credentials. The im-
portance of crisp deduction/abduction reasoning for policy-basedmanagement of autonomic networks is highlighted in [4].
An Autonomic Network [4] crosses organizational boundaries and is provided by entities that see each other just as busi-
ness partners. Policy-based network management already requires a paradigm shift in the access control mechanism, from
identity-based access control to trust management and negotiation. In [4] the authors present an algorithm whose opera-
tions are expressedwith logic, and so the access authorization procedure is not directly implementedwith a tool in the paper.
Among the most noticeable works concerning logical reasoning and (crisp) constraints, we need to cite Maher, e.g., [32]
where he investigates abduction applied to fully-defined predicates, specifically linear arithmetic constraints over the real
numbers. In [33], Maher and Huang address the problem of computing and representing answers of constraint abduction
problems over the Herbrand domain. This problem is of interest when performing type inference involving generalized
algebraic data types. Notice that in [34] the authors present a CHR-based tool for detecting security policy inconsistencies,
where (not-weighted) policies are represented by CHR rules.
Concerning instead systems to implement abduction and deduction processes, abduction reasoning has been already
realized in HYPROLOG [35] (available also in SWI-Prolog), which is an extension of Prolog and CHR with abduction and
assumptions. The system is basically implemented by a compiler that translates the HYPROLOG syntax in a rather direct
way into Prolog and CHR.
A different implementation is represented by ACLP [36]; ACLP is a system which combines abductive reasoning and
constraint solving by integrating the frameworks of Abductive Logic Programming and Constraint Logic Programming (CLP).
The ACLP system is currently implemented on top of the CLP language of ECLiPSe as a meta-interpreter exploiting its
underlying constraint solver for finite domains.
10. Conclusion and future work
Wehave proposed an extension of the RT family languages called RTW , whose semantics is based on aweighted extension
of Datalog (i.e., DatalogW ), obtained by representing weights with semiring algebraic structures (see Section 2). These
languages can be used to deal also with vague and imprecise trust level of credentials during the access control decision:
in general, a preference or a cost can be associated to each credential. In practice, we can manage and combine together
different levels of truth, costs or (in general) preferences and finally have amore informative feedback value on to authorize
the access request or not.
We have extended the RT family of languages [1] and we have shown that classical RT 0 and RT 1, RT 2 are respectively
included in our RTW0 , RT
W
1 and RT
W
2 extensions. Moreover, we have extended other two languages of the RT family,
consequently obtaining RTWT and RTWD. After that, we have shown how both deduction and abduction reasoning over
RTW policies can be modeled with semiring-based soft constraint operators (see Section 2); in this way, within the same
semiring-based framework, it is possible to deduce if a given set of weighted credentials has enough cost/trust/preference
to allow the access (i.e., better than threshold t) and, if not, what the missing credentials are and what the missing level
of cost/trust/preference is. The combination of these weighted procedures leads to a more informative decision, which is
necessary, for example, when information is not ‘‘crisp’’.
Notice that other languages can benefit from the underlying semantics provided by DatalogW : we are able to define a
weighted version of other trust-management languages based on Datalog: for example, Delegation Logic [11], KeyNote [12]
and RBAC [13].
Our systematic approach to give weights to facts and rules, contributes also toward bridging the gap between ‘‘rule-
based’’ trust management (i.e., hard security mechanisms) and ‘‘reputation based’’ trust management [9] (i.e., soft security
mechanisms).
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In the future, we plan to investigate the complexity of tractable soft constraints classes [37] in order to cast them in a
tractable Datalog-based language. Therefore, we want to extend also the RT C language [10] (based on Datalog enhanced
with crisp constraints) in its RTWC soft version.
We want also to study the feasibility of using Soft Concurrent Constraint Programming-like languages [2] to represent the
same authorization process: the soft constraints, added to the σ constraint store by the participating parties, will represent
the credentials and the access rules proposed for the request, each statement with its own preference value. In fact, soft
constraints [2] extend classical constraints to represent multiple consistency levels, and thus provide a way to express
preferences, fuzziness, and uncertainty. Then, a query can be modeled with a simple ask(c)−→a action [2], where the c
constraint represents the fact thatwewant to check if it is implied by the store: the ask succeeds (i.e., the request is accepted)
if the store σ entails the constraint c and also if the store is ‘‘consistent enough’’ w.r.t. the threshold a on the transition arrow,
which represents the minimum requested consistency (or preference) level to be satisfied by the query.
At last, we plan to extend in SWI-Prolog the existent CHR module implementing soft constraints [38], by adding the ÷
operator inside the soft module. In this way we could implement a stand-alone policy-based authorization system based on
constraint programming.
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